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The United States suffers from a severe self-inflicted wound. 
Together, federal and state governments impose almost the 
highest corporate tax rate found among advanced countries, 
39 percent. Only Japan is fractionally higher. The high US 
rate has adverse consequences—lost investment, lost jobs, and 
less innovation—and goes a long way to explain slipping US 
competitiveness in the world economy.1 
1. The adverse consequences are spelled out in two policy briefs: Hufbauer, 
Gary Clyde, and Woan Foong Wong. 2011. Corporate Tax Reform for the 
New Century. PIIE Policy Brief 11-2. Washington: Peterson Institute for 
International Economics. Available at http://www.iie.com/publications/
pb/pb11-02.pdf. And by Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, and Martin Vieiro. 2011. 
US Tax Discrimination Against Large Corporations Should be Discarded. 
Some US-based companies that face competition from 
foreign-based companies think they have found the answer: 
by one means or another, persuade Congress to impose US 
taxation on the foreign companies. Instead of attacking the 
root problem—exceptionally high US corporate taxes—this 
“solution”  seeks  to  handicap  foreign  competitors  with  the 
same burdensome tax system that handicaps US-based firms 
when they do business at home and abroad. 
This “solution” has a fundamental flaw: It violates the 
sovereign right of each country to determine its own corporate 
tax system, a right enshrined in double tax treaties and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). A technical appendix to 
this policy brief explains US obligations in detail. However, 
the logic of treaty rights can be easily explained. Suppose that 
Mitsubishi,  a  Japanese  manufacturer  of  heavy  equipment, 
paid an even higher corporate tax rate than General Electric. 
Could Japan “even the score” by taxing GE’s profits on its 
manufacture of power turbines in the United States? Certainly 
not. The mere suggestion would provoke a righteous howl 
from the US government. 
Yet  that  is  exactly  the  “solution”  that  Representative 
Richard Neal (D-MA) and Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) 
seek to impose on foreign-based insurance companies through 
parallel bills introduced in October 2011, respectively H.R. 
3157 and S. 1693. Regrettably, the Obama Administration 
included  similar  provisions  in  its  fiscal  year  2012  budget 
proposals.2 
Earlier  versions  of  the  same  bill  were  introduced  by 
Representative Neal beginning in 1998. My Peterson Institute 
policy brief criticized the 2009 version of the Neal bill (H.R. 
3424).3 What’s new this time around? Tax discrimination takes 
a different form. Specifically, a deduction would be denied 
PIIE Policy Brief 11-16. Washington: Peterson Institute for International 
Economics. Available at http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb11-16.pdf.
2. US Department of the Treasury. General Explanation of the 
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2012 Revenue Proposals, page 46. February 2011.
3. See Hufbauer, Gary Clyde. 2010. Protection by Stealth: Using the Tax Law 
to Discriminate Against Foreign Insurance Companies. PIIE Policy Brief 10-9. 
Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics. Available at 
http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb10-09.pdf.N u m b e r   Pb1 2 - 3   J aNu a r y   2 0 1 2
2
for reinsurance premiums and any additional amounts paid 
to a foreign affiliate by a foreign-owned insurance company 
doing  business  in  the  United  States.  Reinsurance  claims, 
return  premiums,  ceding  commissions,  and  other  amounts 
paid currently or years later by the foreign affiliate to the US 
firm would not be taxed by the United States to the extent of 
deductions denied. 
Perhaps  at  first  glance  this  scheme  seems  fair.  It  is 
anything but. The same denial of deductions does not apply to 
US-owned insurance companies. Even if reinsurance claims, 
return  premiums,  ceding  commissions,  and  other  amounts 
paid  exactly  match  deductions  denied,  the  foreign-owned 
company loses the time value of money. Typically, commercial 
reinsurance claims relate to complex business risks that are 
paid many years later and would represent the overwhelming 
majority of disallowed deductions. Finally, since the foreign 
reinsurance affiliate is in business to make a profit, its receipts 
(the  deductions  denied)  will  normally  be  greater  that  its 
payments (claims). Thus, in an indirect fashion, the foreign-
owned company doing business in the United States will end 
up paying the US corporate tax rate on the foreign affiliate’s 
profit. 
While different in structure than earlier versions of the 
Neal bill, this scheme is just as offensive to double tax treaties 
signed by the United States, and to the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS), a vital component of the WTO 
championed  by  the  United  States.  Not  surprisingly,  the 
European Commission has registered its objection. In a state-
ment issued October 12, 2011, Representative Neal stated 
“The proposed legislation is consistent with US tax treaty and 
trade agreement obligations.” Foreign partners disagree, and 
so will the WTO arbitration panel if the legislation is enacted.
But the self-inflicted damage to the United States will 
come  much  sooner  if  Congress  embraces  this  piece  of  tax 
discrimination. State legislators in Florida, Texas, and Louisiana 
have passed memorial resolutions objecting to the bill. Nine 
Florida Congressmen wrote a letter on November 17, 2011, to 
the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Ways and 
Means Committee, objecting to the bill. Hurricanes inflict 
serious  damage  on  Florida  and  other  southern  states,  and 
reinsurance written by foreign affiliates pays a major portion 
of claims.4 This portion of the insurance market will either 
shut down or premiums will rise to cover the new tax burden. 
Either way, household and business consumers will suffer. The 
Joint Tax Committee scores the latest Neal bill as raising $12 
billion over 10 years. By contrast, the Brattle Group published 
a  report  estimating  that  the  2009  version  of  the  Neal  bill 
would cost consumers $11 billion each year.5 The bill is clearly 
not the tax equivalent of a free lunch. But the estimates do not 
necessarily conflict with one another. It is possible for the new 
tax to raise revenue from those foreign reinsurance firms that 
remain in the US market, but the departure of other foreign 
reinsurance firms could lead to higher premium rates charged 
by the remaining foreign and domestic reinsurance firms. 
The  US-owned  insurance  companies  that  are  champi-
oning the Neal and Menendez bills should consider the possi-
bility that “look alike” legislation abroad could harm their 
own operations. This is not an idle fear. In 2008, after 70 years 
of  a  state-owned  monopoly,  Brazil  opened  its  reinsurance 
market  to  private  firms,  including  foreign  firms.  However, 
in December 2010 and March 2011, to protect its domestic 
insurance industry, Brazil issued Resolutions 225 and 232 that 
required 40 percent of reinsurance to be placed with Brazilian-
owned companies and capped reinsurance payments to foreign 
affiliates  at  20  percent  of  the  initial  premium.6  US-owned 
insurance  companies  operating  in  Brazil  rightly  objected 
to  this  protectionist  outbreak.  But  US  protests  over  such 
measures, and US efforts to open foreign reinsurance markets, 
will be seriously undermined if the United States enacts its 
own version of stealth protection. Since US insurance firms 
are among the most competitive in the world, it seems likely 
that the United States would lose from emulation abroad—
particularly since protectionist copycats are likely to include 
the big emerging markets with a high potential for insurance 
growth. These countries include Brazil, Russia, India, China, 
and South Africa—the classic BRICS. 
There is no reason for the US Congress to go down the 
path  of  tax  discrimination,  harming  relations  with  foreign 
partners  and  imposing  high  costs  on  American  consumers 
4. In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, international insur-
ance and reinsurance firms paid 64 percent of all US claims. In the wake 
of hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita, they paid 47 percent of all claims. 
International insurance companies are also major providers of earthquake 
insurance in California and windstorm insurance in Texas.
5. The Brattle Group. 2009. The Impact on the U.S. Insurance Market of 
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who live in disaster-prone regions. Instead, the US Congress 
should focus on corporate tax reform that puts US companies 
on the same competitive playing field as their foreign rivals. 
Technical appendix: inTernaTional 
agreemenTs in a nuTshell
WTO and GATS
In  1995,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Uruguay  Round  of 
Multilateral Trade Agreements which created the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), the United States inscribed insurance under 
its Schedule of GATS commitments. This locks in the obliga-
tions of the first paragraph of Article XVII National Treatment, 
which reads: 
1.  In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to 
any conditions and qualifications set out therein, each 
Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of 
any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the 
supply of services, treatment no less favourable than it 
accords its own like services and service suppliers.7 
In  the  WTO  Financial  Services  Agreement  (FSA),  an 
annex to the GATS concluded in 1998, the United States 
scheduled a market access commitment for the cross-border 
supply of reinsurance, including national treatment for rein-
surance services and service suppliers.8 Only two exceptions to 
national treatment for reinsurance pertain under the FSA and 
GATS, one specific and one general. The specific exception 
under the FSA relates to a 1 percent federal excise tax (FET) 
on  reinsurance  premiums  paid  to  foreign  companies  when 
they cover US risks; however, the FET is not imposed when 
the premium is paid by a US office or agency of the foreign 
company.9 
7. See GATS Article XVII(1), WTO. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm#articleXVII.
8. US Schedule of Specific Commitments, Supplement 3, WTO Document 
GATS/SC/90/Suppl.3. February 26, 1998. Available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_commitments_e.htm.
9. The specific language for the exception for retrocession and reinsurance 
premiums paid under GATS mode 1 reads: "A one percent federal excise tax 
is imposed on all premiums covering US risks that are paid to companies 
not incorporated under US law, except for premiums that are earned by 
such companies through an office or dependent agent in the United States. 
In Texas, total direct reinsurance of mutual life insurance companies may 
not be entered into with non-US companies." See US Schedule of Specific 
Commitments, Supplement 3, WTO Document GATS/SC/90/Suppl.3. 
February 26, 1998. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/
serv_commitments_e.htm.
The general exception relates to GATS Article XIV(d), 
which permits a difference in the manner of imposing “direct 
taxes  in  respect  of  services  or  service  suppliers  of  other 
Members,” provided that the difference does not “constitute 
a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination… or a 
disguised restriction on trade in services.” This exception does 
not come into play for two reasons: The Neal bill imposes an 
indirect tax not a direct tax; and whatever the label, the differ-
ence in taxation between US and foreign insurance companies 
amounts to “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.”
Like its predecessors, the vintage 2011 Neal bill contains 
an election that the affiliated foreign-based reinsurance firm 
can execute, and choose to be taxed as a US firm, thereby 
relieving  the  US-based  (but  foreign-owned)  insurance  firm 
from the tax penalty. But the election is meaningless, since it 
only offers the foreign-owned group a choice to jump from the 
frying pan into the fire: If it made the election, the foreign-
owned group would face an overall tax burden that discrimi-
nates to an even greater extent.10
If it comes to WTO arbitration, the Neal bill cannot be 
saved by calling the denial of reinsurance premium deduc-
tions a “direct tax.” This linguistic escape hatch would attempt 
to take advantage of the exclusion of direct taxes from the 
national treatment requirement of GATS Article XVII, by way 
of GATS Article XIV(d). But the attempt fails.
Article XIV(d) requires that any difference in direct taxes 
between US-owned firms and foreign-owned firms should not 
“constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion… or a disguised restriction on trade in services.” The 
fact that the Neal bill has been championed by US-owned 
insurance firms speaks to the possibility that it constitutes a 
“disguised restriction on trade.” This possibility is reinforced 
by  the  repeated  references  to  the  competitive  disadvantage 
10. Many US-owned insurance companies control reinsurance affiliates based 
abroad which are subject to total tax burdens at less than the US statutory 
rate. However, the election in the Neal bill would only subject foreign-owned 
insurance companies with reinsurance affiliates based abroad to the US statu-
tory rate. Unlike the rules for US-owned insurance companies that are taxed 
on their actual underwriting and investment income, electing foreign insurers 
also may be subject to IRC Section 842(b), which would require taxation of 
deemed amounts of US effectively connected income. But see the decision 
in The North West Assurance Co. of Canada, 107 T.C. 363 (1966), where the 
US Tax Court rejected the application of Section 842(b) based on contrary 
language in the Canada-US tax treaty. 
Today, the United States  
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faced by US insurers and reinsurers. Moreover, the Neal bill 
surely  imposes  “arbitrary  or  unjustifiable  discrimination” 
since, by a simple drafting change, the same deduction disal-
lowance  could  be  applied  to  all  US  insurance  companies, 
whether US-owned or foreign-owned. 
Returning to common sense, supported by internationally 
agreed definitions of indirect taxes in the WTO Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM), it requires 
a linguistic contortion to characterize the Neal bill as a direct 
tax rather than an indirect tax. An expense deduction normally 
claimed by insurance companies—namely payment of rein-
surance  premiums  to  another  firm—would  be  denied  for 
purposes of computing net income. The resulting tax is a tax 
on revenue, not a tax on net income as commonly understood.
Double Tax Treaties
Following ratification in 1913 of the 16th Amendment to the 
US Constitution, which permitted the imposition of income 
taxes, the United States began to negotiate bilateral tax treaties 
with other countries to avoid the double taxation of income. 
Today, the United States has more than 50 double tax treaties 
in force. Non-discrimination is a fundamental clause of these 
treaties. For example, in the 1985 treaty with Canada, the fifth 
paragraph of Article XXV, titled Non-Discrimination, reads:
5.  Any  company  which  is  a  resident  of  a  Contracting 
State, the capital of which is wholly or partly owned or 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by one or more residents 
of the other Contracting State, shall not be subjected in the 
first-mentioned State to any taxation or any requirement 
connected therewith which is other or more burdensome 
than the taxation and connected requirements to which 
other similar companies of the first-mentioned State, the 
capital of which is wholly or partly owned or controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by one or more residents of a third 
State, are or may be subjected.
Current  US  tax  law  allows  US  insurance  companies 
(whether US-owned or foreign-owned) to deduct reinsurance 
premiums paid to affiliated or unaffiliated insurance compa-
nies based abroad as well as those based in the United States. 
Since  federal  income  taxes  are  covered  by  the  Canada-US 
double-tax  treaty,  it  would  be  inconsistent  for  the  United 
States to deny Canadian-owned insurance companies based 
in the United States the deduction for reinsurance premiums 
paid to their foreign affiliates.11 By the same token, it would be 
inconsistent with the Non-Discrimination provisions in other 
double tax treaties to deny companies based in those countries 
the deduction for reinsurance premiums.
11. US law imposes a FET at a rate of 1 percent on reinsurance premiums 
paid to a foreign insurance company. However, the FET is waived in whole 
or part by US tax treaties with 29 countries, including treaties with France, 
Germany, Ireland, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Because the United 
States does not have a double tax treaty with Bermuda, reinsurance premiums 
paid to affiliates based in that country pay the 1 percent FET. 
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